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the more sensory to the more intellectual, and including all types of thought.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE.

Philosophical Essays in Honor of James Edwin Creighton. By FORMER STUDENTS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1917. Pp. xii + 356.

The best evidence of a teacher's influence is not the acclaim of his students but the character and spirit of their work. The dominant note of the present volume is, on the whole, breadth of view; which is but the motive of justice and conscientiousness. If this is, as we believe, the quality most needed in philosophy, and particularly in American philosophy to-day, Professor Creighton's teaching has been and is of the highest possible service to serious thinking. In one way, it must be admitted, the essays fail to realize fully the spirit which animates them: they are so many that each must needs be too short for thorough discussion of fundamental points. Nevertheless the papers are careful and painstaking, as a rule; particularly those concerned with historical and idealistic topics. To select certain ones of the twenty-two for detailed comment and neglect the rest, would but evince the reviewer's personal preference; and certainly all the papers deserve to be carefully perused by those interested in their subjects. The first seven are concerned with historical topics—Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, *etc.*—and are devoted to the correction of one-sided interpretations hitherto prevalent. We learn that Spinoza was not the rigid and narrow mathematicist of tradition, but was great enough to anticipate, however confusedly, something of the platform of modern idealism. "The great fault of a mediocre thinker usually is that, having been born with a capacity for only the narrowest vision, he hits upon some one category or set of categories. . . . Spinoza's fault was plainly the opposite" (p. 2). "Spinoza . . . comes nearer to Hegel's own organic view than Hegel ever admits" (p. 38). Nor was Hume a mere empiricist: "Hume's skepticism is not the inevitable result of empiricism; it is the consequence of developing an empirical method and judging the outcome by a rationalistic standard" (p. 44). Kant's freedom was quite one-sided; in his system "freedom becomes a defiantly resigned consciousness of determinism" (p. 68), Vedantism, too, with its many sorts of idealism, is a richer philosophy than western thinkers are accustomed to suppose.

The historical papers are followed by three which criticize absolute idealism from within; insisting upon its general correctness, but demanding additions which should abolish the gulf between the Absolute and its appearances. “. . . thought must be explicitly defined as a process of experimentation, trial and error, essentially temporal in its nature” (p. 137); “the sound standpoint in both logic and metaphysics for me is not an organic eternalism, but *organizational Temporalism*” (p. 160). In a critical paper on *The Limits of the Physical*, the inadequacy of “mechanical” philosophy is thus declared: “It is outgrown, doctrinaire folly to suppose that the future development of such a science as economics, for example, will result in the exhibition of its phenomena and their laws as special cases of physical phenomena and physical laws” (p. 178). And “. . . the error [of mechanism] lies in failing to recognize that what is true of all the members taken distributively is not necessarily true of the class as such” (p. 181). “For physical science there are neither German armies nor Democratic victories, neither cabbages nor kings” (p. 182). In most of the remaining papers the ruling motive seems to be dislike of narrowness; as in Mr. Wright’s appeal to volition, the organic fusion of the subjective-objective dualism, in Miss Talbot’s resuscitation of that under-dog, the good old copy-theory, in Miss Jordan’s impassioned protest against the one-sided tendencies of functionalism in education, morals, *etc.* (which protest we heartily welcome), in Mr. Townsend’s laying bare of certain materialistic tendencies of pragmatism, and in Mr. Schaub’s arraignment of that philosophy’s treatment of religion for neglecting the motives of existence and static perfection, without which religion quite loses meaning. All these essays mentioned, as well as some unmentioned, deserve detailed analysis and quotation; but to treat them all fairly would involve more space than a review should occupy. The present reviewer can not, however, forego mentioning the lucid and interesting description by Mr. Baird of certain factors recently unearthed in the thought-processes of man.

At was said above, it is the spirit rather than the results of these papers that is the significant thing; a spirit which needs to be more deeply incorporated into American philosophy than it has yet been.

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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1916-1917. New Series, Vol. XVII. London: Williams and Norgate. 1917. Pp. 497.

The Aristotelian Society volumes are of course familiar to all who follow contemporary philosophical movements, and their value need not be insisted upon here. The present volume is, considering